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We are an intensely creative species. Creativity is the fountainhead of our civilizations
and a defining characteristic of what makes us human. But for all its prominence
at the apex of human mental faculties, we know next to nothing about how brains
generate creative ideas. With all previous attempts to tighten the screws on this vexed
problem unsuccessful – right brains, divergent thinking, defocused attention, default
mode network, alpha enhancement, prefrontal activation, etc. (Dietrich and Kanso,
2010) – the neuroscientific study of creativity finds itself in a theoretical arid zone that has
perhaps no equal in psychology. We propose here a general framework for a fresh attack
on the problem and set it out under 10 foundational concepts. Most of the ideas we
favor are part and parcel of the standard conceptual toolbox of cognitive neuroscience
but their combination and significance to creativity are original. By outlining, even in
such broad strokes, the theoretical landscape of cognitive neuroscience as it relates to
creative insights, we hope to bring into clear focus the key enabling factors that are likely
to have a hand in computing ideational combinations in the brain.
Keywords: connectionist architecture, consciousness, creativity, default network, emulation/simulation,
evolutionary psychology, prediction, task set
INTRODUCTION
The last half century has seen a veritable explosion of knowledge about the mind and how it works.
Perhaps the single most glaring exception in this success story is creative thinking. Indeed, it is
hard to think of a mental phenomenon so central to the human condition that we understand
so little. Careful reviews of the recent literature on the neuroscience of creativity (Dietrich and
Kanso, 2010; Sawyer, 2011; Weisberg, 2013; Yoruk and Runco, 2014) have shown that the field is
heavily fragmented, with data being selectively recruited to support concepts that are theoretically
incoherent and cannot do the explanatory work we require in neuroscience (Dietrich, 2015). At
this point, there is not a single cognitive or neural mechanism we can rely on to explain the
extraordinary creative capacities of an Einstein or a Shakespeare.
The principal reason for this situation is that all current psychometric tests used to look for
creativity in the brain are based on divisions – divergent thinking, defocused attention, remote
associations, for instance – that (1) are false category formations, given their exact opposites –
convergent thinking, focused attention, or close associations, in this case – also precipitate creative
ideas (Dietrich, 2007b) and (2) result in constructs that still consist of many separate mental
processes that are distributed in the brain. For neuroimaging studies, the combination of both
theoretical problems – false category formation and compound construct – makes defeat certain.
Simply put, these so-called creativity tests, such as the Alternative Uses Test (AUT) that are based
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on the division of divergent thinking, cannot identify the
cognitive or neural processes that turn “normal” thinking into
creative thinking. And if you fail to isolate the subject of
interest in your study, you cannot use neuroimaging to hunt for
mechanisms. You just don’t know what the brain image shows
(Dietrich and Kanso, 2010; Sawyer, 2011).
AIM AND SCOPE
The central, motivating intent of this paper is to show a
possible way out of the disciplinary insolvency in which the
neuroscientific study of creativity currently finds itself. There
is a whole host of evidently relevant concepts that, despite
being securely anchored in the bedrock of mainstream cognitive
neuroscience, have so far been ignored in creativity research. As a
matter of tactics, we confine ourselves in this first approach to 10
such concepts. Together they form a neurocognitive framework
less intended to offer a specific set of hypotheses but rather to
inform future experiments on, and theorizing about, the creative
process occurring in human brains. Although the framework
does intimate testable hypotheses, our general strategy at this
early stage is to survey the theoretical landscape and highlight
those concepts that might open altogether new avenues of
research in the field of creativity.
To suitably constrain the scope of our framework further,
we focus exclusively on the computation of creative insights.
Creativity typically refers to a product – something useful, novel
and surprising (Simonton, 2012). An ingenious idea is often
the first step toward a creative product but this is neither
necessary nor sufficient. Creative products come into existence
without the incidence of an antecedent, conscious thought, and
creative thoughts have no impact unless converted into an actual
product. Specifically, we leave to one side steps of the creative
process dealing with the implementation of a creative idea
which often requires additional creative thinking. We also pass
over higher-order evaluative processes, that is, those cognitive
processes that assess the original idea’s merits after it manifested
itself in consciousness. Those processes required for the idea’s
successful execution as well as those carrying out appraisals at the
explicit information-processing level are likely to engage different
cognitive processes and different brain regions (Dietrich, 2004b).
To pursue the question of how brains compute creative ideas,
we bring to the fore a number of well-established neuroscientific
concepts whose explanatory power with respect to creative
cognition has not been realized. Collectively, they sketch out the
contours of a broad framework consisting of what might be called
“foundational concepts” for human creativity. We present the
foundational concepts under 10 headings as follows.
THE FRAMEWORK’S 10 FOUNDATIONAL
CONCEPTS
Evolutionary Algorithms
More than half a century ago, Campbell (1960) proposed that
creative thoughts result from the twofold Darwinian process
of blind variation (BV) followed by selective retention (SR),
or BVSR (see also Campbell, 1974; Popper, 1984; Simonton,
1999). A long debate on the exact parameters of the evolutionary
algorithm, and especially the matter of blindness, has recently
settled on a broad consensus (see Kronfeldner, 2010; Dietrich,
2015) that culture is a variational system with some coupling
between variation and selection. This partial coupling means
that human cultural transmission, and thus human creativity, is
partially directed and thus fits, strictly speaking, neither into the
rigid category requirements of Neo-Darwinian (total) blindness
nor Lamarckian (total) sightedness (Richerson and Boyd, 2005;
Kronfeldner, 2010). Despite this common denominator on the
basic mechanism of human creativity, the two-step evolutionary
rationale has been nearly universally ignored in setting up
empirical protocols in neuroscience. All current psychometric
measures of creativity collapse the two fundamental constituent
elements of the creative process, and it is hard to imagine
useful neuroimaging data from studies blending variation with
selection, given that both likely engage different cognitive
processes and different brain areas (Dietrich, 2004b).
The understanding of creativity as a partially sighted
variation-selection process should guide the search for the
brain mechanisms underlying creativity. One place to start this
quest are four features that distinguish evolutionary algorithms
occurring in brains from those transforming nature, as it is these
four features that can be linked to a neural mechanism (Dietrich
and Haider, 2015). They are: (1) cognitive coupling providing
degrees of sightedness, (2) establishment of fitness values for
hypothetical selection processes, (3) cognitive scaffolding for
multistep thought trials, and (4) the experiences of foresight and
intention.
We have proposed that the main neural mechanism that
enables the cognitive coupling of variation to selection is
the brain’s prediction machinery (Dietrich, 2015; Dietrich and
Haider, 2015). In computational terms, this results in advanced
heuristic algorithms that can boost the effectiveness of the blind,
ex-post-facto search algorithm of the biosphere by orders of
magnitude. This partial sightedness must necessarily be driven
via predictive processes.
For the mind’s second adaptation, we first need to describe a
complication inherent in thought trials. Evolutionary algorithms
require a fitness function. In the biosphere, this is done by
causal factors in the environment; that is, selection occurs in
the real world, on individuals made flesh. But in simulations,
or hypothetical thought trials, the selection process depends on
merit criteria that must also be modeled. On what basis is this
done? Since the very essence of creativity is to go into uncharted
territory, how do we know what would be adaptive in that
unknown topography.
A third adaptation that enhances the basic evolutionary
algorithm is scaffolding. In nature, every variation-selection cycle
in a species’ trajectory is actualized and must, in its own right, be
a viable form. The basic move in Darwinian evolution, in other
words, is to generate-and-field-test. Brains, on the other hand,
can short-circuit instantiation and breed multiple generations
in a hypothetical manner. The basic move, then, becomes to
generate-and-hypothesis-test. This produces a striking effect.
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Because some designs require elements that cannot be realized
without a temporary scaffold, a mechanism that includes an
instant pay-off requirement, such as biological evolution, can
also not build them. What scaffolding permits is that trajectories
through the infosphere can bypass impossible intermediates.
The benefit is a plethora of higher-order, discontinuous design
solutions. Cognitive scaffolding also has important implications
for the debate on continuous versus discontinuous processing in
insight formation.
Finally, the creative process in the biosphere is not teleological.
It serves no end, and its designs are neither premeditated nor
deliberately initiated in response to a perceived need. Human
creators, by contrast, act on purpose; they create with intent
and with an objective in mind. Although one might expect
such improvements in a process that inexorably bootstraps, this
argument is typically framed in cognitive psychology in terms
of expert systems and often falsely considered at odds with
evolutionary models of creativity.
Predictive Processing
The second foundational concept, the assumption of predictive
computation, holds that the universal principle of brain function
is to generate predictions (Wolpert et al., 2003; Grush, 2004;
Bar, 2007; Clark, 2013), making a perpetual variation-selection
search process the brain’s default operating mode. The core idea
is that for behavior to be purposeful and timely in a high-
dimensional environment, we must continuously, automatically,
and unconsciously generating expectations that meaningfully
inform – constrain – perception and action at every turn
(Wolpert et al., 1995; Llinas and Roy, 2009; Clark, 2013). Even
when not engaged in a specific task, the brain actively produces
predictions that anticipate future events (Moulton and Kosslyn,
2009).
The brain’s prediction machinery offers a mechanistic
explanation for the complex properties of cultural evolutionary
algorithms running in brains that we outlined in the previous
section. Specifically, our idea is that internal representations
of the emulated future, which we call ideational RPGs,
or Representations of Predictive Goals, provide the neural
mechanism for the four special properties of our mind’s
evolutionary algorithms. They can address (1) partial sightedness
or coupling, (2) the ability to set a fitness function in an unknown
solution space, (3) cognitive scaffolding, and (4) the feeling of
foresight and intention (Dietrich, 2015).
Finally, well-established Bayesian inference techniques could
tell us how such advanced evolutionary algorithms converge on a
predicted goal state or the potential creative solution (Dietrich
and Haider, 2015). We think that the prediction perspective,
especially when embedded into a larger evolutionary frame, offers
a promising direction in our search for the creative process taking
place in brains.
No Single Place; No Single Process
In foundational concept 3, we set forth the vaudeville conception
of creativity (Dietrich, 2015). The vaudeville conception of
creativity is based on two fundamental notions in neuroscience:
modularity and non-linearity. The brain’s functional specificity,
or modularity, suggests that the recombination of bits and pieces
of content into novel configurations must come from the same
neural circuits that normally handle those bits and pieces of
content. This must also be conceded as part of our understanding
of the brain as a non-linear information processor.
The tacit assumption that has been driving creativity research,
however, is the opposite. Creativity is obviously special and there
must be something, somewhere, that makes it so. This way of
thinking betrays the commitment to a distinct factor, an extra
something – the creative bit, if you like – that’s specifically added
to the plain mix to make the sparkling difference. Powered by this
instinctive hunch, creativity is routinely treated as a monolithic
entity and assigned to some brain network (e.g., default mode
network, DMN) or associated with a particular cognitive process
(e.g., divergent thinking). The fact that such conclusions are
based on “creativity tests” that combine a false category formation
with a compound constructs, effectively renders this research
paradigm phrenology.
In our view, any global statements about creativity per se being
located in specific brain areas or networks is devoid of meaning
and would border on an outright violation of the modular
conception of brain function. What the vaudeville conception of
creativity does is to shift the focus from mistaking colorful brain
images as a substitute for an explanation to the software side of
things, that is, the cognitive and computational processes that
implement variation-selection runs leading to creative thoughts.
Network Dynamics of Global
Competition
The fourth foundational concept is the brain’s connectionist
architecture. It takes the conventional position that information
processing – selective attention, working memory, or cognitive
control – involves large-scale competition between widely
distributed representations that are biased by top-down,
prefrontal activity (e.g., Baars, 1988; Dehaene and Changeux,
2011).
One important element that might shed light on the
computation of creative ideas is the strengthening mechanism of
connectionist models, as it is this mechanism that helps transient
coalitions to reach threshold levels and turn them into conscious
representations. The release of dopamine from neurons in the
ventral tegmental area, and their subsequent activity in prefrontal
and limbic regions, is currently the main proposal for such
mechanism (Schultz, 2000; Rose et al., 2010). The possibility that
a dopamine signal precedes the emergence of a creative insight
might inform more precise neuroscience research on creativity.
Dual Systems
For foundational concept 5, we add one more layer of complexity
to the basic connectionist platform, the view that two distinct
systems for knowledge representation exist, one implicit and one
explicit (Reber, 1993; Dienes and Perner, 1999). This distinction
seems to matter a great deal for the urgently needed task of
parsing creativity into different types that have some validity.
The explicit system is a sophisticated system that is tied
to consciousness and thus capable of representing knowledge
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in a higher-order format. In contrast, the implicit system is
inaccessible to consciousness. It is stimulus-driven and, as
its information is encapsulated, it cannot form such higher-
order representations (Dienes and Perner, 2002; Haider and
Frensch, 2009; Haider et al., 2011). Due to these encapsulated
representations, the explicit system, or any other functional
system in the brain, does not know about knowledge imprinted
in the implicit system. However, implicit knowledge can affect
performance by, for instance, biasing our current predictions.
The differences between these two systems in terms of creative
capacity have been treated elsewhere (Dietrich, 2004a, 2015).
Here, we only briefly highlight some differences related to the
predictive machinery of each system (Downing, 2009). Due to
the implicit system’s inability to represent hypothetical future
scenarios, implicit prediction is online; that is, it works only
in known and currently present solution spaces. In general, the
implicit system uses a stochastic process to optimize behavior,
simply testing out, by trial and error, solutions to environmental
contingencies (Perruchet and Vinter, 2002; Haider et al., 2011).
The implicit system does use prediction – in the motor system,
for instance – but can only do so for already learned actions.
It cannot launch ideational RPGs into abstract and unknown
solution spaces. In terms of sightedness, prediction in the implicit
system only possesses (partial) sightedness for known problem
spaces, a situation that does not really qualify as creativity. For
explorations in terra incognita, we have proposed that the implicit
system can still be creative, but this creativity must be limited to
the blind algorithms in nature (Dietrich and Haider, 2015). We
have also hypothesized that these features are more consistent
with the flow state (Dietrich, 2015).
The game-changing advantage of explicit prediction is that the
explicit system can generate ideational RPGs that can be used
to gain some sightedness in unknown problem spaces. Explicit
prediction can thus operate oﬄine; that is, on problems that are
hypothetical and that can be solved outside real time (Grush,
2004; Moulton and Kosslyn, 2009). Ideational RPGs, in other
words, internalize the selection process since the parameters of
that goal state prediction work as a fitness function. With the
ability to simulate a complete internal model, we can imagine –
predict the effects of – events in uncharted territory.
Task Sets
Foundational concepts 6 is the construct of a task set (Allport
et al., 1994; Monsell, 2003; Dreisbach and Haider, 2009). A task
set denotes the configuration of mental resources that goes with a
task. Through instructions or schemas, it defines those aspects of
the task to which we selectively attend, the features of the stimulus
that are bound to certain dimensions of the response as well as the
response selection. The construct was formulated in response to
experiments providing evidence that switching between different
tasks produces substantial performance costs (Allport and Wylie,
2000; Monsell, 2003).
We cannot perform a task until the cognitive system is
properly attuned and organized. If the task changes the new
task set must first be uploaded, so to speak. It is a kind
of mindset containing the elements and their values that are
tagged as temporarily belonging together in the network because
they played a role in completing the task in the past. By
facilitating, top-down, certain task-relevant cognitive operations
and inhibiting others, the implementation of a task set affects
the processing of all stimuli associated with that task and, by
extension, of a problem space.
A task set guarantees internal stability to keep the ongoing
task free from interference and disruption by other task sets
(Dreisbach and Haider, 2009). At the same time, task-set
activation must also allow enough flexibility for mental gear
changing so that we can adjust should the context necessitate it
(Neumann, 1984).
The importance of this theoretical construct to the
phenomena of creativity should be immediately self-evident. The
task representation governs, for instance, how we would initially
approach a problem-solving task (Knoblich et al., 1999; Öllinger
et al., 2013). It also maps the shape of the solution space and
establishes critical search parameters. These settings are, in effect,
predictions about the kinds of solutions that are likely. Moreover,
task set strength determines the degree of functional fixedness, or
cognitive flexibility, and the probability for remote associations.
Task-Set Inertia
Foundational concept 7 is the related notion of task-set inertia.
Task-set inertia (Allport et al., 1994) was introduced to explain
an unexpected asymmetry in task-switching studies that could
not be accounted for with task-set reconfiguration alone. Like
task sets, it is also a concept that, as far as we know, has not yet
been applied to creative thinking, despite its obvious relevance to
several creativity phenomena.
Since neural networks are not on/off switches, we can expect
that a strongly interacting coalition of neurons does not instantly
decay back to baseline. Any disintegration phase would take time,
during which a new task set would be subjected to interference
from the previous one. It would seem obvious that task-set
inertia, extended to creative thinking, holds precious clues for
understanding incubation. The fact that the removal of a problem
from conscious awareness can break the impasse that often
frustrates the problem-solving process shows that the task-set
coalition associated with it must continue to reverberate with
purpose.
But carryover activation in the knowledge structure is unlikely
to be the only mechanism here. For instance, creative insights,
have a way of popping up long after we last worked on a problem
and it is hard to see how transient task-set inertia could linger
for days or weeks. Also, the fact that there remains a problem in
need of a solution is unlikely to be embedded at the level of the
knowledge structure itself. This is a type of goal representation
and it should require higher-order brain regions, such as the
prefrontal cortex.
One way to address these complications might involve
the notion of fringe working memory (Cowan, 1999, 2005).
Working memory is thought to have a focal center and a
fringe, with the latter containing information that still has
some conscious properties. Following a task switch, a goal
representation could remain active in the fringes of working
memory and continue to provide, via top-down projections,
some organizational control to steer the spreading activation
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in the task-set coalition toward a solution. Task-set inertia
and fringe working memory are concepts that would seem to
provide propulsive help in understanding the mechanism that
rearranges bits of information into ideational combinations while
the conscious mind is otherwise applied.
Large-Scale Networks
Foundational concept 8 relates large-scale brain networks – the
central executive and the DMN, in particular – to creativity
(Raichle et al., 2001; Bressler and Menon, 2010). We explore what
we can, and cannot, say about them in the context of creative
thinking.
The DMN is a set of neural regions that shows heightened
activity during resting states as well as during a number of
directed mental tasks, which led to the idea that DMN activity
supports mind-wandering or moments of introspective self-
talk and thought (Mason et al., 2007). More recently, the
DMN is often characterized as being involved in predictive
processing and the ability to simulate worlds that differ mentally,
temporally, and physically from the present. It includes medial
temporal lobe structures, especially the hippocampus and
parahippocampal cortex, the medial parietal and lateral temporal
cortices, especially the temporal-parietal junction, as well as the
medial prefrontal cortex, cerebellum and thalamus (Buckner,
2012).
We have the foreboding sense that the recent proposals
that link the DMN to creativity has appealed to some for
the unfortunate reason that it feeds into old and misbegotten
category formations about creativity, such as divergent thinking
or daydreaming. But there is no reason to presume that the other,
central-executive network (CEN) is not also involved in creative
thinking.
The CEN is anchored in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
and several areas of the posterior parietal cortex (Bressler and
Menon, 2010). It controls executive functions and shows activity
whenever, we have to focus our attention on a specific task.
Indeed, activity in the CEN is inversely correlated with the DMN.
They operate like two components of a flip-flop circuit; while the
DMN is associated with endogenous activity, the CEN is driven
by exogenous input. As might be expected, predictive processing
has also been associated with this CEN (Downing, 2009; Clark,
2013).
The notion that the DMN is a proactive system implies
that there must be a continuous search process taking place
that reduces uncertainty even when no task is at hand. This
constant anticipatory drive in the DMN during moments
of passive contemplation brings it into close contact with
the concept of task-set inertia and the specific phenomenon
of incubation. If the DMN is active during introspective
simulations of the future and, by extension, simulations of
possible alternative solutions to a problem, we can assume
that it also shows inertia once a problem is incubated.
This possibility could inform neuroimaging research on
incubation.
We are careful not to associate one network, or some kind of
back-and-forth interplay between them with creativity per se, or
divergent thinking for that matter (Beaty et al., 2016). This, we
think, is just another false category formation and a version of
the monolithic entity fallacy. Rather, we consider that the two
processing modes, or the two core networks, support different
types of creative thinking.
The Deliberate Mode
Finally, we close by defending, under headings 9 and 10,
the proposal that there are two distinct modes, or types, of
creativity that emanate from the explicit system, a deliberate,
top-down mode (foundational concept 9) and a spontaneous,
bottom-up mode of processing (foundational concept 10;
Dietrich, 2004b, 2007a). The decomposition of creativity
into variation and selection aside, this deliberate-spontaneous
partition of creativity, along with a third flow mode that
emanates from the implicit system, is the only one that we
think has empirical and theoretical support. We also suggest
that a mapping of the two modes on to the CEN and
DMN might provide more hypotheses for future imaging
studies.
The deliberate problem-solving mode is strongly biased by
top-down pathways from the prefrontal cortex so that the
rearrangement of informational units has built-in predispositions
that are likely constrained by biases, expectancies, schemas,
and previous experiences. In other words, the search function
is restricted to more commonsense solutions that are more
paradigmatic and rely on more close associations. But being
tied to effortful and conscious processing, the deliberate mode
also enables us to bring the full toolbox of our higher-
cognitive function to bear on the problem, including focusing
attention, retrieval of relevant memories, and the recombination
of knowledge by sustaining several representations in mind at
once.
The advantage of such advanced heuristic algorithms is, of
course, efficiency. But trimming the vast search space also has a
drawback. The deliberate mode only works well if the solution
is indeed located in the predicted area of the problem space. To
quip, while the deliberate mode has the advantage of limiting the
solution space, it has the disadvantage of limiting the solution
space!
The Spontaneous Mode
For foundational concept 10, we contrast the deliberate mode
with novel ideas that emerge from a spontaneous problem-
solving mode in which top-down influences are weakened and
the search function is less directional. Although this comes
with a speed and efficiency tradeoff, the spontaneous mode
has the potential to chance upon more paradigm-shifting ideas
or remote associations. During incubation or various altered
states of consciousness, the brain shifts a problem from a
deliberate to a more spontaneous mode of processing that
is not controlled by intentional reasoning. This significantly
weakens the supervisory, top-down biases from the prefrontal
cortex that guided the effortful deliberations. The drawback,
however, is that a spontaneous mode does not benefit from
the higher-order and efficient forecasting ability of conscious
thought.
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CONCLUSION
Creativity has a dubious distinction in the psychological sciences.
For no other mental phenomenon so central to the human
condition do we know so little as to how the brain does it.
Reviews of the existing literature (e.g., Dietrich and Kanso,
2010; Sawyer, 2011) have shown that the field is heavily
fragmented and its neuroscientific findings are invalidated by
false category formations and compound constructs. The aim of
the present paper was to suggest alternative ways to attack the
problem.
Our framework of human creative thought consists
of 10 foundational concepts organized into 10 separate
headings. The ideas we favor are all part and parcel of
cognitive psychology and neuroscience: evolutionary algorithms,
predictive representations, distributed processing, connectionist
architecture, explicit-implicit distinction, task set, task-set-
inertia, large-scale networks, and top-down vs. bottom-up
processing. However, their significance to creativity, especially
the crossties we developed here among them, is original. Together
they form a neurocognitive framework that provides a fresh
attack on the possible mechanisms that compute ideational
combinations in the brain.
As a matter of tactics, we limited ourselves to those concepts
that we think hold the greatest potential for progress. The
framework is not intended to be complete. But for our purposes,
the degree of completeness is not important. So long as it
is agreed that the combination of concepts we bring to the
fore are fundamental to creative cognition and possess eminent
explanatory power that has not been realized. We hope that our
framework helps revitalize research on an issue that defines our
humanity.
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